We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. The extent of fairness of an allocation is measured by its Nash social welfare, which is the geometric mean of the valuations of the agents for their bundles. While the problem of maximizing Nash social welfare is known to be APX-hard in general, we study the effectiveness of simple, greedy algorithms in solving this problem in two interesting special cases.
Introduction
We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations for the goods. The fairness of an allocation is quantified by its Nash social welfare [NJ50, KN79] , which is the geometric mean of the valuations of the agents under that allocation. The notion of Nash social welfare has traditionally been studied in the economics literature for divisible goods [Mou04] , where it is known to possess strong fairness and efficiency properties [Var74] . Besides, this notion is also attractive from a computational standpoint: For divisible goods, the Nash optimal allocation can be computed in polynomial time using the convex program of Eisenberg and Gale [EG59] .
For indivisible goods, Nash social welfare once again provides notable fairness and efficiency guarantees [CKM + 16]. However, the computational results in this setting are drastically different from its divisible counterpart. Indeed, it is known that the problem of maximizing Nash social welfare for indivisible goods is APX-hard when agents have additive valuations for the goods [Lee17] . On the algorithmic side, the first constant-factor (specifically, 2.89) approximation for this problem was provided by Cole and Gkatzelis [CG15] . This approximation factor was subsequently improved to e [AGSS17] , 2 [CDG + 17] and, most recently, to 1.45 [BKV17] . Similar approximation guarantees have (i.e., the number of nonzero-valued goods in its bundle). 1 Prior work [DS15] has shown that a Nash optimal can be found efficiently under binary valuations (via reduction to minimum-cost flow problem). However, these techniques crucially rely on valuations depending linearly on cardinality, and it is unclear how to extend these to the aforementioned utility model. Our results, therefore, provide novel, exact algorithms for maximizing Nash social welfare under concave valuations.
Preliminaries
Problem instance An instance [n] , [m] , V of the fair division problem is defined by (1) the set of n ∈ N agents [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n}, (2) the set of m ∈ N goods [m] = {1, 2, . . . , m}, and (3) the valuation profile V = {v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n } that specifies the preferences of each agent i ∈ [n] over the set of goods 
Binary and identical valuations
We say that agents have binary valuations if for each agent i ∈ [n] and each good j ∈ [m], v i,j ∈ {0, 1}. In addition, we say that agents have identical valuations if for any good j ∈ [m] and any pair of agents i, k ∈ [n], we have v i,j = v k,j . For identical valuations, we will assume, without loss of generality, that the value of each good is nonzero.
is the bundle allocated to the agent i. Let Π n ([m]) denote the set of all n partitions of [m] . Given an allocation A, the valuation of an agent i ∈ [n] for the bundle A i is v i (A i ) = j∈A i v i,j . An allocation is said to be non-wasteful if it does not assign a zero-valued good to any agent, i.e., for each agent i and each good j ∈ A i , we have v i,j > 0. We will use the terms allocation and partition interchangeably whenever the set of goods [m] is clear from the context. Nash social welfare Given an instance I = [n], [m], V and an allocation A, the Nash social welfare of A is given by NSW(A) :
. An allocation A * said to be Nash optimal if A * ∈ arg max A∈Πn([m]) NSW(A). An allocation B is said to be a β-approximation (where 0 ≤ β ≤ 1) for the instance I if NSW(B) ≥ β · NSW(A * ). For the approximation guarantees to be meaningful, we will assume that the Nash optimal for any given instance has nonzero Nash social welfare.
Main Results
We provide two main results: a 1.061-approximation algorithm for identical valuations (Theorem 1), and an exact algorithm for binary valuations (Theorem 2). The proofs of these results are presented in Sections 4 and 5 respectively. 
Theorem 1 (Identical valuations). Given any fair division instance with additive and identical valuations
) ≥ v(j 2 ) ≥ . . . v(j m ) > 0. 2 Set A ← (∅, ∅, . . . , ∅). 3 for ℓ = 1 to m do 4 Set i ← arg min k∈[n] v(A k ) //
Identical Valuations: Proof of Theorem 1
This section provides the proof of Theorem 1, which we recall below:
Theorem 1 (Identical valuations). Given any fair division instance with additive and identical valuations,
there exists a polynomial time 1.061-approximation algorithm for the Nash social welfare maximization problem.
Our proof of Theorem 1 relies on two intermediate results: First, we will show in Lemma 1 that the allocation computed by the greedy algorithm (called Alg-Identical, given in Algorithm 1) satisfies an approximate envy-freeness property called EFx, defined below. We will then show in Lemma 2 that any allocation with this property-in particular, the allocation computed by Alg-Identicalprovides a 1.061 approximation guarantee.
We start by describing the notion of envy-freeness and some of its variants.
Envy-freeness and its variants Given an instance [n], [m], V and an allocation A, we say that an agent i ∈ [n] envies another agent k ∈ [n] if i prefers the bundle of k over its own bundle, i.e.,
An allocation A is said to be envy-free (EF) if each agent prefers its own bundle over that of any other agent, i.e., for every pair of agents i, k
Likewise, an allocation A is said to be envy-free up to the least positively valued good (EFx) if for every pair of agents We will now describe our algorithm called Alg-Identical.
Greedy algorithm for identical valuations
As mentioned earlier in Section 1, our algorithm Alg-Identical (Algorithm 1) allocates the goods one by one in descending order of their value. In each iteration, a good is assigned to the agent with the least valuation. Assigning goods in this manner ensures that at each step, the algorithm picks the agent providing the greatest improvement in NSW. It is easy to see that Alg-Identical runs in polynomial time. Our next result (Lemma 1) shows that Alg-Identical always outputs an EFx allocation.
Lemma 1. The allocation A returned by Alg-Identical is EFx.
Proof. Let A ℓ be the allocation maintained by Alg-Identical at the end of the ℓ th iteration. It suffices to show that for each ℓ ∈ [m], if A ℓ−1 is EFx, then so is A ℓ . Write j ℓ to denote the good allocated in the ℓ th iteration, and let i be the agent that receives this good; thus
Notice that only the valuation of agent i is affected by the assignment of j ℓ , while the allocation any other agent k ∈ [n] \ {i} is unchanged. Therefore, in order to establish that A ℓ is EFx, we only need to consider agent i and show that v(
and each j ∈ A ℓ i . Since Alg-Identical processes the goods in decreasing order of value, the good j ℓ is the least valued good in A ℓ i . Thus, for any j ∈ A ℓ i , we have that
here, the last inequality follows from the agent selection rule of Alg-Identical, i.e., the fact that i ∈ arg min k∈[n] v(A ℓ−1 k ). This shows that A ℓ must be EFx.
Our final result in this section shows that any EFx allocation provides a 1.061 approximation to Nash social welfare when the valuations are additive and identical. For any agent k ∈ [n − 1] with two or more goods in A k , EFx property implies that
Proof. For notational convenience, we reindex the bundles in the allocation
In particular, Equation
denote the set of agents with such singleton bundles. Write s = |S| and let A S := {j 1 , j 2 , . . . , j s } denote the set of goods owned by the agents in S. For analysis, we will now consider a set of allocations where only the goods in A S are required to be allocated integrally, and any other good can be allocated fractionally among the agents. Formally, we define a partially-fractional allocation B ∈ [0, 1] n×m as follows: for every good j ∈ A S , B i,j ∈ {0, 1} for any agent i ∈ [n] subject to i B i,j = 1, and for any other good j ∈ [m] \ A S , B i,j ∈ [0, 1] for any agent i ∈ [n] subject to i B i,j = 1. We let F denote the set of all such partially-fractional allocations, and let A F denote the Nash optimal allocation in F. 2 Since all integral allocations belong to F, we have NSW(A F ) ≥ NSW(A * ). Therefore, in order to prove the lemma, it suffices to show that NSW(A) ≥ 1 1.061 NSW(A F ).
Observe that all goods in A S , namely j 1 , j 2 , . . . , j s , must belong to separate bundles in A F . This is because the combined value of all goods in [m]\A S is strictly less than 2ℓ(n − s). Therefore, if two (or more) goods in A S belong to the same bundle in A F (say, A F a ), then there must exist another bundle in A F (say, A F b ) with value strictly less than 2ℓ. In that case, we can simply swap the bundle A F b with one of the goods (of value more than 2ℓ) in A F a and strictly improve NSW, which is a contradiction. Therefore, without loss of generality, each good in A S belongs to a unique bundle in A F . Using this observation, we can reindex the bundles in A F such that
It is easy to see that α ≥ 1. 3 In addition, we can show that α < 2. Indeed, as argued above,
e., α < 2. Using this bound we can establish a useful structural property of A F : For all i ∈ S, the bundles A F i are singletons (i.e., A F i = {j i } for all i ∈ S) and, for all k / ∈ S, we have v(A F k ) = αℓ. This follows from the observation that any bundle A F k in A F which has a fractionally allocatable good (say, good j) is of value equal to αℓ = min a v(A F a ); otherwise, we can "redistribute" j between A F k and arg min k v(A F k ) to obtain another fractional allocation with strictly greater NSW. Moreover, since for any i ∈ S, j i ∈ A F i and v(j i ) > αℓ (recall that α < 2), the bundle A F i does not contain a fractionally allocatable good. This, in particular, implies that ∪ i∈S A F i = A S . All the remaining goods in [m]\A S are fractionally allocatable, and hence the bundles A F k for all k / ∈ S are of value equal to αℓ. This structural property gives us the following bound for NSW(A F ):
We will now provide a lower bound for NSW(A) that will allow us to prove the desired approximation guarantee. This is done by constructing an allocation A ′ ∈ F such that NSW(A ′ ) ≤ NSW(A). Along with Equation (2), this provides an analysis-friendly lower bound for the quantity
We start with the initialization A ′ ← A. Next, while there exist two agents i, k
(the lesser valued bundle) to A ′ k (the larger valued bundle). Such a transfer is possible because the goods in the bundles with value less than 2ℓ are allowed to be allocated fractionally. Notice that the Nash social welfare does not increase as a result of this transfer. Also, it is easy to see that this process terminates, since after each iteration of the while loop, either v(A ′ i ) = ℓ or v(A ′ k ) = 2ℓ or both, and hence some agent can take no further part in any future iterations. Upon termination of the above procedure, there can be at most one agent (say, r) such that v(A ′ r ) ∈ (ℓ, 2ℓ); for every other agent
Notice that by construction of A ′ , S ⊆ T ; hence, s ≤ t. We then have the following bound on the Nash social welfare of the allocation A ′ :
Let φ = k∈[n]\S v(A k ) denote the combined value of all goods except for those in the set A S . We will now use the allocations A F and A ′ to obtain upper and lower bounds for φ, which in turn will help us achieve the desired approximation ratio for the allocation A.
First, recall that the goods in the set A S = {j 1 , j 2 , . . . , j s } are allocated as singletons in A F to the 3 If α < 1, then it must be that v(A F n ) < ℓ, i.e. a nonzero amount of fractional good is taken away from the bundle An. In that case, one can reassign (part of) this fractional good-currently assigned to one of the agents in [n − 1]-to A F n and strictly improve the Nash social welfare, contradicting the assumption that A F is the Nash optimal in F.
bundles i ∈ S . Along with the fact that v(
Next, in the allocation A ′ , each bundle corresponding to agents in T \ S is valued at exactly 2ℓ, and that for each agent in [n] \ T (except for the agent r) is valued at exactly ℓ. By overestimating v(A ′ r ) to be 2ℓ, we get φ ≤ 2ℓ(t + 1 − s) + ℓ(n − t − 1).
Equations (4) and (5) together imply that
We can lower bound the quantity of interest
, as below:
(from Equations (2) and (3))
(from Equation (6) and for large n) ≥ 1 2 e ln 2 ≈ 1 1.061
(minimum at α = 1/ ln 2 ≈ 1.44).
In the penultimate inequality, the reason for using the approximation 2 α−1− 1 n−s ≈ 2 α−1 is as follows: Imagine constructing a scaled-up instance I ′ consisting of c copies of the instance I, where c is arbitrarily large. Notice that I ′ has additive and identical valuations. Moreover, for any allocation A that is a β-approximation for the instance I, the allocation B = (A, A, . . . , A) is β-approximation for I ′ . Similarly, A is EFx for I if and only if B is EFx for I ′ . Finally, write n ′ , s ′ , α ′ , ℓ ′ to denote the analogues of n, s, α, ℓ in I ′ . It is easy to see that n ′ = cn, s ′ = cs, α ′ = α and ℓ ′ = ℓ. Since the agent with the least valuation in I (under allocation A) values his bundle at strictly below 2ℓ, we know that s < n, and thus the quantity n ′ − s ′ = c(n − s) can be made arbitrarily large for appropriately chosen c. We can therefore ignore the term 1 n−s in the exponent of 2 without loss of generality. This completes the proof of Lemma 2.
The following example shows that the approximation guarantee of Lemma 2 is almost tight.
Example 1 (Tightness of approximation factor for EFx allocations). Consider a fair division instance with m goods (m is even) and n = 2 agents, where the (additive and identical) valuations are given as follows: v(j 1 ) = v(j 2 ) = m − 2, and v(j ℓ ) = 1 for ℓ ∈ {3, 4, . . . , m}. Notice that the allocation A = {(j 1 , j 2 ), (j 3 , . . . , j m )} is EFx. Additionally, NSW(A) = ((2m − 4) · (m − 2)) 1/2 . It is also clear that NSW(A * ) = 3 2 (m − 2). The approximation ratio of A is given by
, which closely matches the approximation guarantee of Lemma 2.
Binary Valuations: Proof of Theorem 2
This section provides the proof of Theorem 2, which we recall below:
Theorem 2 (Binary valuations). Given any fair division instance with additive and binary valuations, a
Nash optimal allocation can be computed in polynomial time.
Our proof of Theorem 2 relies on a greedy algorithm (Algorithm 2, hereafter referred to as Alg-Binary). Starting from any suboptimal allocation, Alg-Binary identifies a pair of agents such that a chain of swaps between them provides the greatest improvement in Nash social welfare (from among all pairs of agents). Lemma 3 quantifies the progress towards the Nash optimal allocation made by Alg-Binary in each step. As it turns out, the algorithm is required to run for at most 2m(n + 1) ln(nm) iterations. Overall, this provides a polynomial time algorithm for computing a Nash optimal allocation for binary valuations. The detailed description of Alg-Binary follows.
Greedy algorithm for binary valuations
The input to Alg-Binary is an instance with additive and binary valuations along with a suboptimal allocation, and output is a Nash optimal allocation. At each step, the algorithm performs a greedy local update over the current allocation. Specifically, given a partition A = (A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A n ), Alg-Binary constructs a directed graph G(A) as follows: There is a vertex for each agent (hence n vertices overall), and between any pair of vertices u and v, there are |Γ v ∩ A u | parallel edges directed from u to v. 4 A directed edge (u, v) exists if and only if there exists a good that is valued by v and is currently assigned to u. Observe that a directed simple path P = (u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u k ) in G(A) corresponds to a sequence of reallocations. For each directed edge (u i , u i+1 ), there exists a good j ∈ A u i that can be reassigned to u i+1 via the updates
Let A(P ) denote the partition obtained by reallocating goods along the path P = (u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u k ). Such a reallocation increases (decreases) the valuation of u k (u 1 ) by one, while the valuations of all intermediate agents u 2 , . . . , u k−1 are unchanged. The algorithm Alg-Binary greedily selects a specific path P in G(A), and reallocates the goods along P to obtain the partition A ′ := A(P ). Lemma 3 below describes the progress towards the optimal solution made by such a reallocation.
Lemma 3. Given a suboptimal partition A, there exist agents u and v such that v is reachable from u in G(A), and reallocating along any directed path P from u to v leads to a partition A ′ := A(P ) that satisfies
Here A * denotes the Nash optimal partition. Update A i ← arg max Remark 1. Note that there can be multiple paths P from u to v in G(A), and different goods that can be reallocated along a fixed edge of P , which might lead to different partitions A(P ). However, the Nash social welfare of any resulting partition is the same, since the valuation of u (v) goes down (up) by one and that of every other agent remains the same. Hence, the choice of path between a fixed pair of vertices is inconsequential.
In the remainder of this section, we will show that Lemma 3 can used to prove Theorem 2, followed by a proof of Lemma 3.
Proof of Theorem 2. Lemma 3 ensures that if there does not exist an improving reallocation, then the current allocation A i−1 is optimal. Hence, for the rest of the proof, we will focus on the case wherein the for-loop executes for all 2m(n + 1) ln(nm) steps.
The update rule followed by Alg-Binary and Lemma 3 together guarantee that at the end of iteration i, we have
Repeated use of the above bound gives
Since Alg-Binary executes for 2m(n + 1) ln(mn) iterations, the difference between the optimal partition A * and the partition A ′ returned by the algorithm is given by
(since ln m ≤ m, and n, m ≥ 2)
Since the valuations are assumed to be integral, and i∈[n] v i (A ′ i ) ≤ m n , we have that NSW(A * ) = NSW(A ′ ). Hence, A ′ is Nash optimal. This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
We will now provide a proof of Lemma 3.
Proof of Lemma 3. Our proof of existence of the desired path P in the graph G(A) is made convenient by the formulation of another graph G * (A). This graph is utilised only in the analysis of the algorithm and never explicitly constructed.
Recall that A * refers to a Nash optimal allocation. Consider the directed graph G * (A) consisting of n vertices, one for each agent, and a directed edge (u, v) for each good j ∈ A u ∩ A * v . The edge (u, v) indicates that the good j must be transferred from u to v to reach the optimal partition A * . Note that the total number of edges in G * (A) is at most m.
Besides defining the graph G * (A), we also classify the agents depending on their valuation relative to A * . In particular, let E and D denote the set of agents with excess and deficit valuations respectively, i.e., E := {u ∈ [n] :
The remainder of the proof consists of two parts: First, we will show that the edge set of G * (A) can be partitioned into simple directed paths P = {P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P k } and cycles C = {C 1 , C 2 , . . .} such that each path P i ∈ P starts at a vertex in E and ends at a vertex in D. Second, we will use this decomposition to argue that one of the paths P i ∈ P leads to a partition A ′ := A(P i ) that satisfies the bound in Lemma 3. The lemma will then follow by observing that the edges of P i are also contained in the graph G(A) constructed by Alg-Binary. Note that the existence of P i shows that the end vertex of P i (say, v) is reachable from the start vertex of P i (say, u) in G(A). As noted earlier in Remark 1, reallocating along any path between u and v leads to the stated improvement in Nash social welfare.
We will start by proving the claim about decomposition of the edge set of G * (A). Consider a graph H * where for each vertex u of G * (A), we include max(indegree(u), outdegree(u)) vertices, say {u 1 , u 2 , . . .}. Suppose the vertex u has ℓ incoming edges and ℓ ′ outgoing edges in G * (A). To construct H * , first we pick an arbitrary one-to-one assignment between the incoming edges and {u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u ℓ }. Similarly, each outgoing edge gets uniquely assigned to one of the vertices in {u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u ℓ ′ }. With these assignments in hand, for every directed edge e = (u, v) in G * (A), we include a directed edge (u i , v j ) in H * if and only if e is assigned to u i and v j . It is easy to see that each edge in H * corresponds to an edge in G * (A) and vice versa. Notice that each vertex in H * has at most one incoming and at most one outgoing edge. Furthermore, if u i is a source in H * , then u ∈ E. Similarly, if v j is a sink in H * , then v ∈ D. These properties together imply that the edges in H * can be partitioned into paths and cycles such that each path starts at a vertex u i with u ∈ E and ends at a vertex v j with v ∈ D. The correspondence between the edges of H * and G * (A) gives us the desired collection of paths P = {P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P k } and cycles C in G * (A). 6 The aforementioned properties also imply that the paths in H * are edge-disjoint, therefore k ≤ m.
We will now show that for one of the paths P i ∈ P in G * (A) (and therefore, also in G(A)), the partition A ′ := A(P i ) achieves the bound in Lemma 3. First, observe that reallocating along a cycle in G * (A) does not change the Nash social welfare. Hence, in order to reach a Nash optimal partition starting from A, it suffices to reallocate goods along the paths P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P k . Moreover, since the paths in P are edge disjoint in the graph H * , they correspond to reallocation of disjoint sets of goods. This means that the reallocations corresponding to a path P i ∈ P can be performed independently of those corresponding to another path P j ∈ P.
Next, consider the sequence of partitions B 1 , B 2 , . . . , B k , obtained by successively reallocating along the paths P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P k . That is, B 1 = A(P 1 ), B 2 = B 1 (P 2 ) and so on. Thus, the partition B k must be Nash optimal, i.e., NSW(A * ) = NSW(B k ). Consider the telescoping sum given by ln NSW(
We will now show that the partition A ′ := A(P i ) satisfies ln NSW(A ′ ) − ln NSW(A) ≥ ln NSW(B i ) − ln NSW(B i−1 ).
Indeed, recall that each path in P starts at a vertex in E and ends at a vertex in D. Hence, as we proceed through reallocations corresponding to P 1 , . . . , P k , the cardinality of the set of goods assigned to any agent u ′ ∈ E is non-increasing and that of v ′ ∈ D is non-decreasing. Therefore, if u (v) is the start (end) vertex of P i , then k u ≥ k ′ u and k v ≤ k ′ v , where k u , k v , k ′ u and k ′ v are the number of goods assigned to u and v in partitions A and B i−1 respectively. Since ln NSW(B i ) − ln NSW(B i−1 ) = ln(k ′ u −1)+ln(k ′ v +1)−(ln k ′ u +ln k ′ v ) and ln NSW(A ′ )−ln NSW(A) = ln(k u −1)+ln(k v +1)−(ln k u +ln k v ), the concavity of ln(·) implies Equation (8). Finally, Equations (7) and (8) Notice that the proof of Lemma 3 works exactly the same way when for each agent i, v i (A i ) = f i (|A i |) for some concave function f i . That is, the valuation of an agent can be an (agent-specific) concave function of the cardinality (i.e., the number of nonzero valued goods owned by the agent). Thus, Alg-Binary can find a Nash optimal allocation in polynomial time even when the valuation functions of agents are concave in cardinality. This observation is formalized in Corollary 1.
Corollary 1. Given any fair division instance with concave and binary valuations, a Nash optimal allocation can be computed in polynomial time.
Remark 2. A well-studied class of valuation functions captured by Corollary 1 is that of budgetadditive valuations [LLN01] . Under this class, the valuation of an agent i ∈ [n] for a set of goods G ⊆ [m] is given by v i (G) := min{c i , j∈G v i,j }, where c i > 0 is an (agent-specific) constant, known as the utility cap.
Garg et al. [GHM18] recently gave a (2.404 + ε)-approximation algorithm for this class (for any ε > 0). For binary valuations, a budget-additive valuation function turns out to be a special case of the concave-in-cardinality functions mentioned above. Hence, by Corollary 1, a Nash optimal allocation can be found in polynomial time when the valuations are binary and budget-additive. It is unclear whether the existing techniques for finding a Nash optimal allocation under binary and additive valuations [DS15] admit a similar generalization.
